Introduction
The idea of social equity has been a recurrent theme in public policies relating to Australian higher education for almost four decades (Rizvi & Lingard, 2011 ), yet appears to be marked more by failure than success (Corrigan & Ng-A-Fook, 2012; Gale, 2009) . Public universities are typified as being either powerless to remove or complicit in maintaining barriers to wider participation. Powerlessness is usually explained as the result of external policy failure; whether poorly constructed (Sehoole, 2005) or nonexistent (Watson, 2004) . When viewed as being complicit in the process, the image of universities as 'ivory towers' is frequently invoked (Karabel, 2005; Watson & Watson, 2013) . Most often however, educational disadvantage is theorised as a function of both, where universities are both subject to and perpetuate social privilege (Bourdieu, 1996) .
Despite the growing power -and desire -of the state to re-form higher education as a lucrative service to be sold in the global marketplace, certain universities still possess sufficient financial and cultural resources to re-legitimise academic cultural capital, and so protect their position of dominance in the field (Naidoo, 2004) . Even as mass higher education increases its overall reach, it is the lower-status universities that disproportionately provide access for students from disadvantaged backgrounds (Naidoo, 2004; Pitman & Vidovich, 2012) .
With this in mind and drawing upon Amartya Sen (2009 ), Simon Marginson (2011a suggests that there are two possibilities for equity in higher education. The first he labels 'fairness' and requires policy to enable proportional social representation in higher education. Here, policy and practice seek to lift the participation rates of underrepresented groups towards levels broadly equivalent to their wider social share. Ideally this applies to all universities, elite or otherwise. This is the approach most often favoured by the state, whether it recognises distinctions of status within the sector or not. For example, when the Government of France in 2010 pressured its country's grandes écoles to set a goal of increasing the percentage of scholarship students to 30 percent, awareness of status drove its actions. However in Australia and the UK, current policies of widening participation make no such distinction and treat the sector as a homogenous entity. Marginson views policies of fairness, whether status is explicated or not, as less desirable for two reasons. First, the long and short lenses of history both suggest that attempts towards fairness inevitably fail. Second, by linking it to Sen's notion of 'freedom as control ' Marginson implies that the normative construction of higher education as a model of social composition is overly oppressive. Whilst some degree of freedom as control is necessary in order to redress inequity, he argues, it is better to focus on 'agency freedom, and especially freedom as power, through learning, knowledge and credentialing' (Marginson, 2011a, p. 30) . This leads to the second possibility for equity in higher education, which Marginson believes is preferable. A focus on equity as 'inclusion', he contends, allows institutions to avoid a one-size-fits-all approach to policy and empower persons formerly excluded to become 'their own best advocates and drivers of participation' (Marginson, 2011a, p. 30) . By allowing institutions to work around (rather than confront) issues of status in higher education, educational inequalities are more fruitfully mapped 'in detail, rather than in aggregate' (Marginson, 2011a, p. 34) . In a sense, Marginson argues that it would be better for universities to inculcate values of justice within and outside the Academy, than be prescriptively just themselves. More 'build them and they will come', than 'build it'.
Marginson's theorisation of equity, status and freedom in higher education was informed by and published during the midst of the implementation of one of Australia's most significant attempts to improve equity in higher education. In 2009, the Federal Government adopted a target that by 2020, 20 per cent of all higher-education students in higher education would be from the bottom population quartile in terms of socioeconomic status (Bradley, Noonan, Nugent, & Scales, 2008) . In Marginson's terminology, this was an attempt to achieve equity through fairness and therefore likely to fail, with the system destined to 'spring back to type, reverting to the earlier distribution' (Marginson, 2011a, p. 30) . At the time his article was published, Australian universities were in a lead-in period spanning 2009-2011, during which student selection practices were in flux. Australia's higher education system has now fully adopted the new demand-driven arrangement and it is therefore timely to revisit the distinction between fairness and inclusion in higher education. It is important that empirical data be used in the search for an objective foundation to reason Habermas, 1971; Parkin, 1996) . Accordingly, this study critically examined the data to search for the consequences of the attempt to make Australia's higher education sector more equitable; whether discourses of 'fairness' and/or 'inclusion' are evident and more specifically the impact on and response by the country's elite universities, to equity policy.
The significance of the findings is more universal. Equity is perhaps the most persistent policy issue in higher education (Martin, 2009 ) and the historical trend throughout most developed nations demonstrates that, whilst participation from disadvantaged groups of students has grown in absolute terms, their relative share has not similarly increased (Hinton-Smith, 2012 ) and this inequality is even greater in elite universities (Schuetze & Slowey, 2002) .
Status in higher education
In higher education, status is the 'elephant in the room'. Everyone knows it exists but rarely talks openly about it or references it in equity policy (Marginson, 2011a) . The reality is that the field of higher education represents a system of knowledge where the symbolic value of an academic qualification is not only in evidence hierarchically (for example a PhD has greater academic capital than a Bachelor's degree) but also situationally; that is, relating to the place where the academic capital was acquired (Pitman & Vidovich, 2012) . Incoming students bring their own academic capital, with some students and their forms of capital being more highly prized than others (Pitman & Vidovich, 2013) . The 'game', as Bourdieu (2002) called it, for both student and institution, is to gain positional advantage into and within the field of higher education by mobilising this capital. Generally, higher-status individuals and universities develop their ability to play the game at rates superior than others (Bathmaker, Ingram, & Waller, 2013) . This is not a game of chance since the dice are loaded; specifically with cultural capital.
Australia's higher education system was formally unified in the late 1980s and is funded and legislated under the affectation that all universities are equal (Macintyre, 2013) . In reality, the existence of at least four strategic groupings within the field of higher education is testament to the sector's fragmentation for reasons of strategy, status and position-taking. The Group of Eight (Go8) universities are the Australian version of the Russell Group in the UK or the Ivy League in the US. Whether measured by income inequalities (Halffman & Leydesdorff, 2010) or historical positional power (Moodie, 2008) , it is apparent these universities represent the elite sub-system at the core of all expanding higher education systems, which remain most resistant to policies of widening participation (Marginson, 2011a) . These universities have and accept the highest level of academic capital, as evidenced by their rankings in international league tables such as the Academic Rankings of World Universities (ARWU).
The Australian Technology Network (ATN) is an alliance of five Australian universities characterised by large undergraduate student populations and a focus on research in newly emerging discipline areas, though its academic staff commit more time to teaching than those in the Go8 universities (Bentley, Goedegebuure, & Meek, 2014) . The ATN claims to champion 'principles of access and equity ' (ATN, 2009 ), yet access rates for disadvantaged students are worse for this group than any other excepting the Go8. Two of the ATN universities appear in the ARWU top 500 list. The seven Innovative Research Universities (IRU) operate mostly in outer metropolitan and provincial cities. The IRU claims to conduct research of international standing and indeed five of its seven members appear in the ARWU top 500. However its national research output places it below both the G08 and the ATN (Department of Education, 2012a). It also records higher-than-average enrolments of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds (Department of Education, 2012b). The six members of the Regional Universities Network (RUN) are located in regional Australia, meaning they are located outside the major cities, which comprise more than two-thirds of the nation's population. All have significantly higher levels of participation from students from groups under-represented in the rest of the sector and its research output is minimal, being less than four per cent of the sector's total output. None of its universities are ranked internationally.
The abovementioned rankings are not offered as a quantitative assessment of the quality of the institution but of the possible status that might be attached to each group, based on their cultural capital. The Go8 undeniably represent the elite part of Australia's higher education sector whilst the RUN possesses the least cultural capital.
The ATN and IRU each draw upon specific and somewhat different categories of capital in order to contest the mid ground. Of course, rankings do not measure higher education quality per se but its proxies. These proxies include prestige, wealth and power and their use omits and distorts as much as they illuminate our understanding of status in higher education (Trow, 1995) . Status is not only earned, but endowed and assumed.
Fairness and inclusion in contemporary Australian higher education equity policy
After eleven years in opposition, the Australian Labor Party was re-elected at the national level in 2007. It soon reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to increasing higher education participation overall, with a particular focus on groups of students traditionally under-represented in universities. Two key recommendations adopted from its 2008 Review of the sector were a) 40 per cent of all 25 to 34 year olds be qualified at bachelor's level or above by 2025 and b) that by 2020, 20 per cent of undergraduate domestic students enrolled but of low socio-economic status (SES) (Bradley et al., 2008) . These two initiatives were the core of what became known as the 'demand driven system', whereby the Government agreed to extend its financial support to all domestic undergraduate students, compared to its previous policy of restricting supply.
The move from a supply-side to a demand-side funding model had an immediate impact on institutional behaviour. From 2009 to 2012, the rate of growth for undergraduate domestic student enrolments increased by a third, compared to the three-year period prior to the implementation of the policy (Department of Education, 2012b). Growth in low-SES enrolments was 22 per cent, leading to a rise in this group's relative share of all enrolments (National Centre for Student Equity in Higher Education, 2013). In other words, students from the main target group increased their participation in Australia's universities in both absolute and proportional terms.
Marginson defines this as a 'fairness' approach to higher education equity, as its foundational purpose is to alter the social composition of the student population, making it more representative of, if not an ideal, then at least a real social system. Marginson also argues that the Australian Government blurred the equity issue by pretending status did not exist:
All government formulae are applied on a uniform basis. Status is the 'elephant in the room'. No one can talk about it -even though everyone knows is there, and that it matters. By becoming status blind, the government can re-represent participation in all institutions as equivalent -regardless of the real social power of participation in different kinds of institution -using aggregate targets such as 20% of all enrolments. It sidesteps the question of the status (or quality) of particular student places (Marginson, 2011a, p. 32). In fact, underpinning the system-wide goal of 20 percent were individual university compacts designed to set institution-specific targets. The formula used took into account the university's historical performance and socio-economic environs. Interim (2012) targets ranged from 5.61 per cent to 22.42 per cent per institution. This approach was designed to result in proportionate increases across the sector, meaning that the elite universities would be rewarded for improving participation at the same rate as other universities, even though their lower base-level meant that a 20 per cent figure would never be realised in their organisations. This was a 'stable-shares' approach to participation whereby the 20 per cent target would be achieved through a uniform increase in the low-SES enrolment shares of each university. Had the Government adopted a strictly fairness approach in meeting the 20 per cent target, certain (notably Go8) universities would have had to increase their historical enrolments of low SES students by up to 40 per cent (Phillimore & Koshy, 2010) . It would be more accurate therefore to define this aspect of the policy as 'proportional fairness'.
Under the Government's stable shares approach to equity policy, each strategic group within the sector exceeded its target in 2012 (See Table 1 ). The Go8's performance was the least impressive of all groups, exceeding its target by less than one per cent. Two of its members (The Australian National University and the University of Sydney) actually saw a decline in low-SES participation between 2008 and 2012.
Despite the reality of the Government's calibrated approach to widening participation, the Go8 publicly represented it as a damaging, one-size-fits-all policy. In its submission to the 2013 Review of the Demand Driven Funding System (the foundation upon which the equity policy was based) the Go8 stated:
Policy development around the uncapped funding initiative to date has reflected a preoccupation with matters of national consistency, including orientations to sameness of supply… uncapped funding in the current policy framework has been expanding the base of the system but at the expense of its apex, just when global competition among leading universities is intensifying (Go8, 2013a, p. 1).
This approach was part a sustained attack by the Go8 against the current policy of access and participation, which in its view was restricting the availability of funds for research in preference to 'enrolling [low-achieving school leavers] directly into Bachelor degree programs ' (Go8, 2012) . Whilst affirming its support for higher education equity in the abstract, the Go8 called for replacing sector-wide targets with more meaningful mission-based compacts under which universities 'could be funded to do different things, and to do them well ' (Go8, 2013b) . That the compacts were actually designed this way was an inconvenient truth overlooked by the elite universities.
Whilst the uncapping supply of undergraduate places was the most publicised feature of the Government's equity policy, it was not its only significant Table 2 .
Over two competitive funding rounds, 27 projects totalling more than $183 million were funded. Each of the sector's groups was well represented; notably the Go8 had representation in nine projects, including six of the eleven funded in the first round.
The high representation of Go8 universities is an important distinction, as
Partnership funding represents an equity policy approach preferring inclusion over fairness. All projects selected for funding supported activities designed to build the cultural capital of disadvantaged students well in advance of them entering higher education. Capital was built in a number of ways. For example, aspirational outreach programs worked to encourage students to view higher education as a meaningful career or life choice. Other universities worked in secondary schools to develop academic communication and writing skills in the students. And pathway programs sought to recognise non-traditional academic qualifications to meet merit-based selection processes. The focus of most of these programs was to build aspirations and skills towards higher education in general, rather than elite universities in particular. This 'inclusive' approach to higher education equity keeps disadvantaged students at armslength from elite universities in two respects. First, they incline disadvantaged students to contribute to an increasing population of 'like' students in low-status institutions than struggle as 'strangers in paradise' (Reay, Crozier, & Clayton, 2009 ). Second, relatedly, if they do aspire to be selected into an elite institution then the student must first transform him/herself: whilst the university cannot change the student's latent cultural class they can support the parents in acquiring compensatory cultural capital at the family level (Dumais & Ward, 2010) . Policies of inclusion represent a win-win for the elite university: the relatively few disadvantaged students who are accepted are, by the end, converted into high-status ones, whilst the remaining majority are diverted to lowstatus institutions.
Fairness, inclusion and an alternative approach to equity in higher education
A critical analysis of the contemporary Australian higher education equity landscape reveals a blurred, rather than binary, distinction between the 'fair' and 'inclusive' approaches. Australia's elite universities' negative reaction to a perceived policy of 'preoccupation with matters of national consistency, including orientations to sameness of supply' (Go8, 2013a, p. 1) ignored its inherent flexibility in setting differential institutional targets and significant support for outreach activities to modify student supply chains. The policy's keystone -the 20 per cent participation target -sought only to achieve the target in the aggregate. Individual institutional targets compensated for historical enrolment trends and in doing so, implicitly recognised status legacies. In this regard, the policy represented a 'proportional fairness' approach to equity in higher education. Importantly, the 20 per cent target was only one element. Significant funds were and continue to be provided to facilitate an inclusive approach to equity, through outreach, alternative pathways and skills-building. Using the financial data from Table   2 , it could be said that the Australian Government adopted an approach to higher education equity that was two-third proportionally fair and one-third inclusive.
Second, there is little evidence that inclusive policies facilitate equity in higher education more effectively. For example, in the five years prior to the Australian Government adopting the 20 per cent target, sector-wide low-SES enrolments rose only marginally, from 14.68 to 15.25 per cent. In the Go8, proportional enrolments actually dropped, from 9.03 per cent to 8.97 per cent (Department of Education, 2012b). The concern for elite institutions is not that policies of fairness will fail, but that they might succeed. Faced with the possibility that contemporary higher education policy might actually be 'unlocking the gates to the peasants', Australia's elite universities continue to prosecute their case with a certain Janus-faced logic. On the one hand, they argue the current policy was never meant to be one of equity but of national productivity; seeking to raise higher education participation overall rather than specific groups of disadvantaged students. Yet in the same policy document (Go8, 2014) they argue that the 20 per cent target cannot be achieved, thereby drawing attention to the fact that the policy largely concerns equity. Elsewhere they argue the cost of financing students towards national productivity is too great, as is the cost of not financing research towards the same end (Go8, 2013c). For some elite universities, equity is an issue for teaching and learning; however if they could avoid subsidising teaching out of research funds they 'would be in a much better position to provide students from disadvantaged backgrounds with financial and other forms of support' (University of Sydney, 2013, p. 1). And whilst a student's prior academic achievement 'is not a definitive measure of academic ability' it is 'a measure of academic preparedness' (University of Queensland, 2013, p. 3 ). Yet academic performance is as much, if not more, a function of social status as innate intellectual ability (James, 2001 ). This is why, despite the mislabelling of Australian higher education policy as 'fair', Simon Marginson is right in the broader and more important sense. The Orwellian contention that some people are more equal than others remains relevant in contemporary Australian higher education as it does in other higher education systems throughout the world. The data show that those disadvantaged students who do benefit from equity practices continue to be enrolled in disproportionate numbers in low-status universities. This is the reason why some degree of freedom through control remains necessary. If higher education policy continues to ignore the reality of status in the field of higher education, then attempts to make it more inclusive can only ever succeed in the aggregate sense. Acknowledging the function of status in higher education is the first step to recognising, publicly, that students are selected using both merit and normative criteria. Universities admission practices do not solely function to select the most worthy students but also the right students; where 'right' is determined by comparing the habitus that formed the student with the habitus of the institution. When the external policy environment threatens to disrupt this matching process, institutional practices react accordingly: this is the 'iron rule' of student selection (Karabel, 2005) .
Acknowledging this is a necessary step in developing higher education equity policy that will increase access for disadvantaged groups in all strata of higher education.
A further benefit of identifying and differentiating between notions of fairness and inclusion at the abstract level is to help explicate the critical distinction between disadvantage and status. The two are linked, but not identical. Government higher education equity policy seeks to increase representation of disadvantaged students and in this respect all universities -including the elite -are in strong support.
What they resist is increasing the representation of low-status students, which are disproportionately represented in this milieu. Conflating the two hinders the advancement of equity, as it confuses social class with status. This in turn leads to ideological debates surrounding the issue of class, which are a significant barrier to bipartisan political action in Australia (see for example Donnelly, 2013; Seccombe, 2012; Swan, 2014) . In Australia, disadvantage is expressed in terms of socio-economic background, which in turn is defined by geographical location; specifically postcode.
However, in Australia as elsewhere there is a positive correlation between parental income, educational background and their children's pre-tertiary academic performance (Centre for the Study of Higher Education, 2008). Since within each geographical location defined as being 'disadvantaged' there exist a number of students who are not disadvantaged, and these students perform better academically, on average than their peers, it is probable that advantaged students make up a disproportionate number of higher education enrolments from notionally disadvantaged areas (Centre for the Study of Higher Education, 2008).
It is therefore possible for an elite university to select high-status (i.e. academically achieving) students that give the appearance (statistically at least) of being disadvantaged. Elite universities do not oppose a fairness approach that seeks to ameliorate disadvantage; they oppose a fairness approach that ameliorates their positional advantage conferred by status. Elite universities can and do address the former whilst still resisting the latter. These include 'miraculous exceptions' (Bourdieu, 1996) who overcome an initial lack of cultural capital either by purchasing it later (e.g. hiring tutors, enrolling in an elite secondary school) or by exceptional effort (Liu, 2011) .
Simply providing an external funding incentive to enrol disadvantaged students has never worked to any large degree. Certainly the (approximate) $1250 funding incentive did not encourage Australia's elite universities to significantly alter their selection processes. Put simply, a high-status student with accumulated cultural capital makes them still more valuable to an elite university, than a low-status student with subsidised economic capital. Directly increasing the funding is unlikely to be effective, since national budget constraints make a significant increase improbable, especially for a nation that contributes one of the lowest proportions of its GDP towards higher education (OECD, 2013) . Whether the policy context is fair or inclusive or both makes little difference. Elite universities do not resist equity policies of fairness and embrace those of inclusion. They resist both, to varying degrees. Cultural capital is the primary resource that serves universities in their position-taking strategies (Bourdieu, 1993) . It can and is acquired by fiscal means: as Bourdieu reminds us 'economic capital is at the root of all other types of capital' (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 288) . However the influence of economic capital is diluted, in an in inflationary sense, when it is injected from outside the field since all actors benefit in more or less equal proportions and their positions within the field remain essentially unaltered.
However economic capital can also be redistributed within the field. An alternative approach to equity policy therefore is rather than adopting a 'rising tide lifts all boats' philosophy to funding equity in higher education, reconsider the allocation of funding as a tool of position-taking within the sector. The analogy of a trading system, such as an emissions trading scheme is illustrative, though not entirely accurate as shall be explained. An equity participation target could be set for each institution; however they would have the option of either achieving this target themselves or 'purchasing' -in a virtual sense and on an interim basis only -the required number of targeted students from another institution with excess capacity. Most of this money would flow, in real terms, to the university 'selling' the student, which could use it to further improve the recruitment, selection and pastoral support of more students. The remainder of the money would be required to be invested in inclusive policies at the institutional level (e.g. outreach, scholarship, etc) designed to increase actual enrolments at the elite institution itself -not at the aggregate, sector level. Targets could be determined via the stable shares approach or via a weighting, requiring more effort from universities with lower commencing levels (Phillimore & Koshy, 2010) . In either case the price could be progressively increased until it reached a level high enough to preclude the virtual trading of students from low to high status universities. This is necessary since a primary function of virtual enrolments should be to alter the behaviour of the elite institutions, rather than being an end in itself. This is an alternative deployment of fairness through equity. The proportion of higher education students of lower status is increased initially at the aggregate (i.e. sector) level and eventually the individual (i.e. university) level. During the transition phase, any university choosing the virtual option must pay a cost; one which simultaneously protects its cultural capital yet can be mobilised towards the creation of future academic capital. Where this differs from a more usual trading scheme is that the price should not be set by the market; that is, the field of higher education. As a society's broader demographics change and the patterns of marginalisation and inequity alter, so too should the target group and their cultural capital value. This is a decision for a democratic government to make, not an oligarchic higher education market. Such an approach requires elite institutions to do their relative part in making higher education more equitable, rather than their traditional response, which is to support advancements at aggregate levels and at the expense of lower-status institutions, they should be required to compensate them. A trading system approach would allow elite universities to maintain their status and preference for inclusive approaches to higher education. At the same time it would force them to make real change within a given timeframe.
Concluding comments
Status in higher education exists and it matters. Furthermore, status has a significant effect on institutional response to equity policy and when policy is blind to this, its effectiveness is compromised. The distinction between policies of fairness and policies of inclusion is an important one, as it helps identify how universities, particularly elite ones, resist policies predicating fairness. To the extent policies of inclusion are preferred by high status institutions, it is because they protect the cultural capital within the field of higher education, improve the position of the elite and increase the potential of the field to dominate others in society by allowing it to project its doxa more widely.
The issue of status can and should be more clearly referenced in higher education equity policy. One way of doing this is to apply a mechanism of cultural capital exchange within the field of higher education, as described above. It might be argued that the field might view this exchange as being 'illegitimate' (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 282) . However they will not be able to exclude it, so long as they remain, to a degree, a public good. The public purpose of a university is determined normatively, across the wider social space and is given shape and form through public policy. If the public wish public universities to be more accessible then these institutions must accede, or decamp into the private sphere.
Public universities may no longer be public goods to a large degree but they still should provide public good. In order to achieve a more democratic distribution of its benefits, higher education policy needs a greater focus on each institution itself, rather than treating the sector as a homogenous entity, which it is not. Inclusive higher education policy does have the potential to play the dominant role in democratising higher education but only when operating under a broader rubric of fairness, employing freedom through control. Participation $111, 696 $118, 601 $127, 500 $136, 817 $147, 812 Partnerships $80, 358 $62, 118 $64, 680 $48, 310 $48, 463 Total HEPPP $192, 054 $180, 719 $192, 180 $185, 127 $196, 275 Source: https://education.gov.au/higher-education-participation-and-partnershipsprogram-heppp Notes
